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20 March 2006 
Summary 
Most of the 60+ developing countries that have established social funds (SFs) are 
decentralizing their governments as well. But the question of how to tailor SFs – originally 
a highly centralized model – for a decentralizing context has received relatively little 
attention in the literature. We first examine evidence on the ability of SFs to adapt to a 
decentralized context. We then lay out the implications of decentralization for SF 
institutional design step-by-step through the project cycle. The topic is doubly important 
because social funds can increase their effectiveness, and the sustainability of their 
investments, by reorganizing internal processes to take advantage of the political and civic 
institutions that decentralization creates. Local government has an informational advantage 
in local needs and characteristics (time and place), whereas SFs have access to better 
technology and knowledge of sectoral best practice. The key is to create institutional 
incentives that best combine these relative advantages. 
Keywords: Social Funds, Decentralization, Institutional Strengthening, Poverty 
Alleviation, Institutional Design, Local Government 
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  11.  Introduction 
Both social funds and decentralization are major phenomena across the developing world. 
More than 60 countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America have introduced social funds 
over the past two decades (van Domelen 2002), while estimates of the number of countries 
decentralizing range as high as “nearly all countries worldwide” (Manor 1999, vii). Each 
reform has inspired its own literature. The decentralization literature is enormous, 
comprising hundreds of studies going back at least to the 1950s (Faguet 2002). The social 
fund (SF) literature is smaller but has been growing fast lately, as SFs continue to sprout 
around the world and more and more resources are committed to them. 
It is evident from such estimates that most social funds operate in countries at 
various stages of decentralization. But the question of how the social fund model – 
originally a very centralized one – can best work alongside decentralized government 
institutions has not appeared frequently in the literature. This paper takes that question as 
its central focus. The subject is doubly important as, in our opinion, the two reforms have a 
strong potential to complement each other. We first examine empirical evidence on whether 
social funds support or undermine the institutions of government, with particular emphasis 
on local government. We then explore how SF processes can be adapted to work effectively 
with local governments, step-by-step through the project cycle. 
It is important to note that several fundamental questions about both phenomena: Is 
decentralization preferable to centralization?
4 Are SFs beneficial organizational forms? lie 
beyond the scope of a paper that assumes the existence of both initiatives, and asks: How 
can a social fund best be adapted to a decentralized institutional environment? This paper 
accordingly locates itself squarely in the social fund literature, while making use of a 
                                                 
4 Faguet (2004) addresses this question directly. 
  2number of theoretical and empirical insights from the decentralization literature. But before 
we enter into the argument, we must define key concepts clearly. 
1.1 What is a Social Fund? 
Definitions of what a social fund is abound; the proceedings of the Second 
International Conference on Social Funds (World Bank 2000d,1) provides one of the 
simplest and most direct formulations: “Social funds directly finance small community-
managed projects, helping to empower the poor and vulnerable by allowing them to 
become actively involved in their own development.” They are typically organized as 
autonomous public entities outside existing line ministries or public work agencies and 
report directly to the president or a privileged minister (of planning, of the presidency) with 
a coordinating role. Their financial support to communities mostly consists of grants. 
Another key characteristic is that social funds typically enjoy a great deal of 
autonomy with regard to established civil service regulations. Most importantly, SFs 
usually pay higher wages than the regular public sector, and as a result attract more 
qualified staff than most line agencies. In addition, most SFs apply private sector oriented 
management and control systems, and are exempt from slow public procurement 
procedures. This strong degree of autonomy has enabled many social funds to bypass 
institutional weaknesses and bottlenecks common in conventional public sector 
administrations and line ministries. Yet it has also raised concerns as to whether SFs can be 
effectively integrated into existing public sector policies. We return to this debate below. 
1.2 What is Decentralization? 
Definitions abound here as well, with authors often providing extended typologies 
that usually include deconcentration, delegation, devolution, privatisation and others. As 
Faguet (2004) and Ostrom (1993) have argued, such distinctions may reflect the richness of 
policy experimentation occurring throughout the world, but they do analysis a disservice by 
  3conflating fundamentally different reforms under a common title. The incentives and 
institutional forms created by deconcentration and devolution, to pick just two, are not the 
same, and should not be treated as such. In the interests of analytical clarity, this paper 
adopts a stricter, narrower definition. Decentralization hereafter refers to the devolution by 
central (i.e. national) government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, 
political and economic attributes that these entail, to local (i.e. municipal) governments 
which are independent of the centre within a legally delimited geographic and functional 
domain. 
From the point of view of public service reform, the key rationale for 
decentralization is a gain in information and accountability. Local governments will 
generally be better informed about local service needs and demands, and will be more 
accountable to their local constituencies as citizens can exercise a more direct control over 
their local representatives (for example through the electoral process, or direct interactions 
with local government officials). On the other hand, central government, with its larger 
resource base and the ability to attract highly-trained staff, will tend to have superior 
technical capacities to design, implement and supervise projects, and will often be able to 
reap economies of scale by combining many smaller investments into large contracts. 
It has also been argued that decentralization may deepen existing inequalities. This 
may happen when local governments with lower revenue potential and weaker 
administrative capacities deliver fewer public services than authorities in economically 
better off jurisdictions. In addition, it may be the result of power struggles and problems of 
‘elite capture’ at the local level, whereby powerful local interest groups try to redirect local 
spending away from services that would disproportionately benefit poorer households in 
  4the community (e.g. primary education and health).
5 As we will see below, addressing such 
inequalities has become one of the key concerns of SFs operating in a decentralized 
framework.  
2.  Do Social Funds Strengthen or Weaken Public Institutions?  The 
Evidence 
Concerns that social funds crowd out existing government administrations, and that 
their strong degree of institutional autonomy may lead to coordination problems with 
existing public sector policies, are clearly reflected in the evaluation literature on SFs. In an 
influential review of donors’ own evaluations, Tendler (2000) warns that SF autonomy, as 
well as the diversion of resources away from line ministries that they occasion, serve to 
weaken, and not strengthen, the institutions of the state. Dijkstra (2004) maintains that 
social funds distort sectoral coherence in water and sanitation, health, and education, and 
privilege donor priorities over sectoral priorities. The same point is made by a World Bank 
study of 66 social funds (Carvalho and White 2004), which argues that SF policies are 
rarely integrated with sound sectoral strategies in the areas in which they operate.  
This lack of sectoral integration risks generating negative effects on the ground, as 
social funds often find it difficult to ensure that investments are maintained and operated by 
responsible line agencies once project works are completed. For instance, Carvalho et al. 
(2000) point out that while SF facilities usually had better staff and equipment than 
comparator facilities, their operation and maintenance suffered deficiencies during the 
operational life of the investments.  
                                                 
5 It is generally assumed that central governments will be more immune to such pressures than local 
governments, because they have more resources at their disposal and are accountable to a larger electorate 
(Bardhan 2001). 
  5On the other hand, evidence suggests that SF, due to their efficiency-oriented 
management procedures, were able to operate much more dynamically than conventional 
ministries and public works agencies. Recent evaluations of SF projects show that this has 
resulted in a number of positive outcomes on the ground. Van Domelen (2002) cites a six-
country study, including over 21,000 treatment households, and many more controls. Her 
evidence shows that social fund projects
6 are better targeted to the poor than other 
government programs, and respond to important local needs. SF investment improved not 
only the quality of infrastructure in education, health, and water and sanitation, but also 
access to and utilization of services. And these investments have proved sustainable, with 
most SF facilities still operating several years after completion. Newman et al. (2002) 
provide similar quantitative evidence for the case of Bolivia: SF health projects raised 
utilization rates of public services, and were associated with substantial decreases in under-
five mortality rates; SF water investments increased the quantity of water available to the 
poor, and decreased under-five mortality by a similar amount again. In Peru, Paxson and 
Schady (2002) and Schady (2000) show that, despite political interferences, SF investments 
in education and other sectors flowed disproportionately to the poor, reaching a larger 
fraction of them than other, similar programs. Finally, Marcus (2002) draws on evidence 
from Mali, Tajikistan and Mongolia to argue that social funds provide effective social 
services, help the poor to build up assets, and enable them to benefit from economic 
growth. 
Social fund autonomy is thus a two-edged sword, capable of improving access of 
the poor to the most basic services of the state, but capable also of weakening the line 
ministries that provide those services, and disrupting policy coherence in their sectors. 
                                                 
6 Donors usually refer to SF “subprojects”, as their own financing of SF operations are the primary “projects”. 
For simplicity I ignore this and refer to SF-financed schemes as “projects” (e.g. a school, a sewerage system). 
  6What effects do social funds have on local government capacity, and on the state’s ability 
to decentralize more broadly? 
2.3 Social Funds and Decentralization 
Broadly speaking, there is a risk that social fund operations tend to centralize rather 
than decentralize the management of local investments. In most countries, including many 
that have since begun decentralizing, social funds were established as highly centralized 
institutional mechanisms. This shaped their design and operating procedures, such that 
many early SFs effectively bypassed local authorities and communities, often carrying out 
all aspects of social investment themselves: promotion and needs assessment, project 
design, financing, supervision of execution, and often initial operation and maintenance of 
the services in question. 
On the other hand, social funds have a number of design principles that place them 
in a better position to adapt to decentralized environments than traditional centralized 
public sector projects. By their very nature, social funds are designed to respond to local 
demand and implement local investments with the active participation of local communities 
(i.e. many social funds required local counterpart payments or local labour to implement 
projects). Such intensive interactions with communities have enabled many SFs to amass 
crucial expertise about local investment demands and the specific challenges involved in 
realizing projects in a highly localized environment (Jorgenson and Van Domelen 1999). 
As a consequence, it should be expected that SFs are natural candidates to work in a 
framework where investment priorities are identified locally rather than centrally.  
In practice, it is generally accepted that most SFs did pose an obstacle to 
decentralization in the early years of operation, as they tended to bypass local governments 
in the identification and implementation of projects (cf. Carvalho et al. 2002). The early 
literature on social funds and decentralization clearly reflect this. The Jamaican Social 
  7Investment Fund, for example, coordinated poorly with local government, leading to low 
sustainability of its investments. In an innovative analysis of its ability to promote 
participation and community-driven development, Rao and Ibáñez (2003) show that JSIF 
projects were driven by local elites, and suffered weak community participation, low 
responsiveness to ex-ante community needs, and improvements in trust and organizational 
capacity flowing disproportionately to the richest and best educated. Reacting to similar 
tensions in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua, Benería and Mendoza (1995) call for these 
Central American social funds to embrace community participation and back a deep 
process of democratic decentralization. Schroeder (2000) also stresses the importance of 
complementarity between social funds and decentralization. But his evidence on the extent 
to which this is possible is necessarily scant, as the case he studies – Malawi – had only 
begun to decentralize. 
Several years down the road, however, it is fair to conclude that that most social 
funds have successfully adapted to decentralization contexts. To begin with, many SFs – 
such as Honduras, Albania, Armenia (Schmidt 2002) – are explicitly designed to support 
decentralization reforms. In these cases the roots of the coordination between SF operation 
and decentralization policy are no longer coincidental coexistence but the result of 
conscious institutional design.  
In other cases where policy choices were less explicit, SFs tended to gradually 
adjust to new decentralized contexts. Experience shows that this adjustment process works 
in two directions. First, in countries where decentralization policy was at an early stage, 
SFs often played a strong proactive role in advancing decentralization agendas via 
innovations in their own project cycles. For instance, Serrano and Parker (2000: 46) report 
that in Bolivia the social fund provided significant groundwork for the passing of the 
national decentralization law, because it had demonstrated that demand-driven investment 
  8planning was possible. Likewise, when decentralization started to gather momentum in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and again Honduras SFs played a decisive role in promoting local 
government investment by developing and disseminating planning tools (Warren and 
Serrano 2003, and Serrano 2005). Similar evidence can be cited from African countries, 
such as Zambia and Madagascar, where SFs were among the first to train local 
governments and to pilot decentralized project implementation procedures on a large scale 
(cf. World Bank 2000e, 2001). According to Van Donge (2004), the Zambian SF operates 
almost entirely through local government, with local officials administering and 
supervising SF activities at the district level, and SF employees playing a backstopping 
role.
7 For many rural communities this represented the first real occasion to gain good 
hand-on experiences in the planning and management of local public services. 
Second, once decentralization is well advanced, it has often created pressures to 
adjust the design of social funds to the new policy environment. Here, new demands from 
the central and the local level have tended to go hand in hand. At the national level, 
decentralization reforms have often provided a beneficial context for central governments 
to enhance the integration of social funds into existing public sector strategies. For 
example, most governments in Latin America – where decentralization reform already has a 
long tradition – have recently begun to redefine the global mandate of social funds, 
effectively turning them into mechanisms for conditional investment transfers that 
complement general transfers to local governments (Serrano 2005). In some cases, these 
reforms even led to the closure or merging of SFs with other development agencies. For 
example, in Mexico the social fund-type project Pronasol was closed and transformed into a 
matching grant system for local governments (Serrano 2005). Similar evidence can be 
reported from Sub-Saharan Africa where some SFs type projects are now integrated into 
                                                 
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
  9more coordinated local development programs (e.g. Mali, Ethiopia, cf. World Bank 2005, 
2006)  
At the local level, pressures to redesign SFs are often the result of changed 
institutional environments and more complex decision making procedures under 
decentralization. As implementation procedures are decentralized administrative tasks and 
contracts that could previously be dealt with internally or in a highly centralized fashion are 
multiplied and localized. As we will see below this forced many SFs to develop more 
flexible management procedures and delegate more responsibilities to local stakeholders. In 
addition, decentralization imposes new demands on the transparency of SF operations as 
local leaders may seek to exploit SF resources for political gain or as SFs may find 
themselves drawn into conflict between political parties that compete at the national and 
local level.  
More concretely, once planning and decision making authorities are devolved to the 
local level, SFs no longer need to act as catalysts for local preference revelation and 
consensus-building. For example in most Latin American countries (cf. Warren and 
Serrano 2003), municipalities identify their own local investment plans, and the fund’s role 
is reduced to approving and (co-)financing resulting project proposals. Likewise, when 
local governments control significant amounts of revenue, SFs typically lose their 
‘monopoly’ position as the sole financier of local investments. Again, this changes the role 
of  SFs to a simple provider of co-financing and, possibly, technical support while reducing 
its involvement during the identification of local investment priorities.  These changes and 
the challenges they represent for SFs are summarized in figure 2. 
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Important SF Qualities in an Environment Which Is:
Centralized Decentralized
1 Process efficiency 1 Manage complexity
2 Competence throughout 2 Negotiation
the project cycle 3 Listening/Openness
3 Command and control 4 Coordination and delegation
 
 
Before turning to the redesign of SFs for decentralization in more detail, it is 
important to note a general lesson that emerges from the experiences cited above: SFs must 
work within the bounds and norms of the local government process, and where possible try 
to enhance it. SF practices which are not consistent with a country’s legal and institutional 
framework for local government will tend to undermine the latter, and may at the limit 
expose local officials to charges of illegality in the natural course of project business. This 
is of particular importance since often in the past SF design was a sort of unconstrained 
maximization, seeking the greatest levels of efficiency while admitting few concessions to 
existing government procedure. Such temptations must be resisted in a decentralized 
environment, as working successfully with existing local government and civic institutions 
is important to a social fund’s success, defined both in narrow project terms and broadly as 
overall social impact. Hence at an early stage SF design should take into account the 
country’s laws, norms, accounting standards, and other institutional framework for local 
(and regional) government, and design SF processes around these. The remainder of this 
paper discusses specific examples of how this can be done through the various stages of the 
SF project cycle. 
  113.  Social Fund Design – The Project Cycle 
3.1 Fiscal Allocation Systems 
By the sheer amount of resources they command, SFs can and often do provide an 
important complement to existing fiscal transfer systems. Theoretically, it is possible to 
envisage two extreme cases. First, SFs can function as a conditional transfer that assigns 
fixed investment budgets to eligible municipalities under a predefined transfer formula. If 
these allocation criteria are clear and transparent, and investments are managed directly by 
local governments (see below), such an approach can provide an important boost to 
decentralization as it enhances the planning and decision-making autonomy of local 
authorities. Drawbacks include the large amount of resources required, a possible widening 
of the gap between decentralized investment decisions and national policy priorities, and 
the fact that SF allocations may distort local taxation efforts if they are not attached to 
adequate co-financing arrangements.  
Under a second scenario, SFs can be used to direct decentralized spending towards 
national policy priorities or to redistribute public resources between better-off and poorer 
regions in the country. By definition this approach will be less conducive to 
decentralization. Centrally defined priorities and targeting criteria will play a much stronger 
role in identifying eligible local governments, the choice of investment options will be 
more restricted and social fund staff will play a stronger role in approving and – possibly – 
implementing project proposals. On the other hand, targeted approaches of the type 
described here can be an important complement to ongoing decentralization reforms, 
particularly if they are used to address regional inequalities or tensions between national 
and local investment priorities that may arise under a decentralized framework. 
In practice most countries under investigation here combine elements of both 
approaches during the redesign of their social funds. In countries where decentralization is 
  12already well advanced and local governments are given significant command over their 
own budgetary resources, SFs are often transformed into conditional matching grant 
mechanisms, designed to favour certain types of investments or regions in the country. The 
Bolivian SF, for example, assigns indicative allocations to local governments under a 
poverty and population based formula. These allocations are then disbursed as matching 
grants with higher shares of central financing if projects correspond to national priorities 
(Serrano 2005; similar systems now exist in El Salvador and Mexico). In other countries 
where decentralization is less advanced and local governments have fewer resources at their 
disposition (for example Madagascar), SFs tend to finance nearly all project costs (with the 
exception of small counterpart payments traditionally required by most SFs). In a setting 
like this, the SF effectively can be described as a separate investment transfer mechanism 
that complements much smaller general purpose grants to local governments. Such funds 
also often apply poverty based allocation formula and/or specific outreach mechanisms to 
increase the share of investments going to poorest regions. 
3.2 Revelation of Local Demand and Project Identification 
Project identification is one of the most important stages of the project cycle. It is 
the first exposure that rural communities have to SF staff and procedures, and sets the tone 
for the interactions – cooperative, paternalistic or conflictive – that follow. This first stage 
of the project cycle consists of two distinct components: (a) determining communities’ 
needs and preferences for public investment, and (b) identifying a project the SF can 
finance which responds to these needs.  
A common critique of SF project identification (but also of other projects that use 
participatory planning procedures; see Mosse 2000) is that participatory planning 
procedures used in the process are superficial, and that investment priorities tend to reflect 
SF objectives rather than genuine local preferences. There are a number of reasons why this 
  13can happen: SF staff may face perverse incentives to speed up the identification process, 
given the sheer amount of resources and projects they manage; they may use their local 
prestige and expertise to influence the local decision making process; or local preferences 
may simply be distorted by fixed project menus that were common in most early SFs. The 
consequences of such distortions on project quality and sustainability can be grave. Poor 
communities with limited income and time may be forced to dedicate their scarce resources 
to projects that don’t really reflect their priorities. Likewise, project sustainability may be 
affected as local users may be unwilling to contribute to the maintenance and operation of 
infrastructures that are perceived to be the outcome of an externally imposed decision.  
There have, however, been positive developments in the area of project planning – 
and again decentralization reforms and SFs have often gone hand-in-hand in nurturing this 
change. In the context of decentralization, many governments now legally require local 
authorities to determine investment priorities through participatory local planning exercises. 
In countries like Bolivia, Peru, and Madagascar, these new regulations have forced SFs to 
change their identification procedures and reduce the exposure of SF staff in the planning 
process. In other countries SFs have played a more proactive role in developing and 
formalizing local planning tools, which in turn triggered changes in national legislation in 
order to systematize and harmonize these new procedures (Nicaragua, Honduras, El 
Salvador; see Serrano 2005).
8 Regardless of whether municipal investment plans are 
initiated by the social fund or by national authorities, the consequences are often the same. 
Once local governments gain sufficient experience with local planning processes, they 
often emerge as the arbiters of local priorities and progressively push back the influence of 
                                                 
8 However, also in countries of the first group, social funds often played an important role in financing and 
supporting local planning processes. This is notably the case in Madagascar where the social fund financed 
planning exercises in more than half of rural municipalities (source personal communication with project 
staff).  
  14social fund staff in the planning process. Key elements of effective project identification 
that emerge from these experiences are summarized in figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Elements of Effective Project Identification
1 Work through local government to support community
to identify its own needs.
2 Ascertain and accept local needs that are identified.
3 Be prepared to walk away from communities whose needs
do not match SF priorities.
4 Ensure specific projects are supported by beneficiary
communities via cash, labor & in-kind contributions.
5 Tie SF staff incentives to long-term project success, and not
project pass-through or approval rate.
 
Another important development is that the context and philosophy of project 
identification tend to change the longer a SF has been in operation. Compared to earlier 
years, most SFs now gradually reduce their outreach and planning activities as communities 
and local governments become more accustomed to their procedures, and knowledge about 
the availability of SF support becomes more widespread. In addition, many social funds 
now experiment with relatively open and flexible project menus. A logical next step would 
be the introduction of simple ‘negative lists’ that provide maximum choice at the local 
level. Nevertheless, the degree of flexibility a SF can adopt in redefining its project 
selection mechanisms significantly depends on its overall development mandate and the 
type of allocation system adopted (see above).  
In spite of these positive developments, it is important to note that a number of 
challenges persist during project identification. Especially in countries that require 
municipal planning exercises, it is important to ensure that decision-making processes are 
not ‘hijacked’ by local politicians (or other local elites), and that communities have 
adequate say during the selection of projects. Where this risk exists, SFs can influence the 
  15quality of local development plans by requiring a minimum of community participation, or 
by developing and disseminating appropriate planning tools among local government 
officials. 
In addition, identifying a project from a community’s expressed needs may be less 
than obvious. This is because raw community priorities will generally take the form of 
social problems, such as low literacy or chronic disease, the solutions to which may not be 
obvious, or – worse yet – about which the affected community may be mistaken. For 
example, a community suffering from cholera may demand a health clinic when the 
appropriate intervention may in fact be an education campaign combined with a potable 
water project. Although social funds will typically have no particular advantage in needs 
identification per se, other than the resources and commitment to facilitate it, they will have 
the technical ability to turn information on raw needs into viable projects, which 
communities and even local governments may lack. Cooperation between fund and 
community can thus optimise the utilization of different types of information available for 
planning a local project, so long as the fund deals sensitively with community needs and the 
two agree on the form that a solution to the latter’s problems will take. These lessons have 
been put to good use in Argentina and Bolivia (World Bank 2000a), and ignored at 
significant cost in Peru (Serrano 2000a). 
An important lesson from the field is that a competitive mechanism for project 
selection can generate important benefits. In El Salvador and Indonesia local governments 
compete for investment, and in Indonesia – where bidding takes place among villages in the 
same jurisdiction– this has led local governments to propose investments that have positive 
externalities for neighbouring municipalities (World Bank 2003, Serrano 2005) . 
Experience from these projects shows that the introduction of explicit competition into 
project selection enhances both the quality of incoming project proposals and the 
  16effectiveness with which resources are spent. Another benefit is that competition sends 
clear signals about investment priorities, selection criteria and the rules of the game more 
generally. On the negative side, competitive selection can make pipelines lumpy, can lead 
to operational bottlenecks, and may disadvantage local governments or communities that 
lack capacity to develop viable proposals.
9 Hence, whether and under what conditions a 
competitive selection mechanism should be introduced needs to be determined on a case by 
case basis. 
Lastly, there is a persistent risk that SF staff will continue to face trade-offs between 
the depth of planning procedures and the number of projects that need to be approved 
within an area. The best solution to this problem is to permanently review incentives within 
social funds, as well as to acknowledge that municipal planning – just like project 
implementation – should become a regular element of SF impact evaluations.
10 We return 
to these points below. 
3.3 Project Design 
Once a project based on a community’s needs has been identified, it must be 
designed. Project design transforms a project idea into specific technical plans, with a 
budget and timetable. This implies resolving important questions like size/scale, technology 
and location, to name a few, which impact greatly on who will eventually benefit from the 
project and the character of benefits received – that is, on ultimate project success. From a 
decentralization point of view the project design process must, again, strike a careful 
balance between the social fund’s technical expertise and efficiency in project design, and 
the community’s specific knowledge about needs and surroundings. For example, the local 
                                                 
9 However, Serrano (2005) reports that this latter problem was not observed in the case of the El Salvadorian 
SF. 
10 Positive examples include an evaluation of the Jamaican Social Fund, that looked among other things at 
project identification, and a recent evaluation of local development plans in Madagascar. 
  17population will know better where best to site a school in order to exploit sunlight, avoid 
floods and facilitate access. But fund staff will be better informed about architectural best 
practice, and education ministry technical standards for construction. Both types of 
knowledge are important for project design, which must meld diverse information into a 
single set of technical and budgetary plans. Hence the design process must contain 
incentives for each side to contribute its share of the necessary information. 
In reality, communities and local government often provide important preliminary 
inputs during the process of project identification described above (these inputs can include 
information on the siting of a investment and the specific needs it has to address). But it is 
often more difficult to ensure active local participation during the actual technical design of 
a project, particularly when technical capacities at the community level are low. Many SFs 
respond to this problem by sub-contracting technical designs to specialized planning 
bureaus or individual technical consultants. Moreover, they typically require that project 
design respects technical standards developed by sector ministries or the SF itself.  
Project design thus represents a step in the project cycle where most SFs could 
enhance the participation of local government officials and communities. In countries 
where decentralization is well advanced, some SFs do this by putting local governments 
and/or communities in charge of managing and monitoring contracts with planning bureaus 
(e.g. Madagascar, cf. World Bank 2001). In contexts where local capacities are too weak to 
effectively carry out this monitoring function, social funds should require from accredited 
planning bureaus that they develop project designs through a closely coordinated exercise, 
and that approval by local authorities is sought at regular intervals in the planning process. 
Figure 4 lists key elements of good project design. 
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Elements of Good Project Design
1 Ability to integrate technical information on project design with
locally-specific information on needs and the environment
2 Incentives for SF staff to include community and local
government inputs into the design process
Require local approval at crucial junctures
Judge staff performance according to long-term project
success
 
3.4 Project Approval 
The approval of subprojects is traditionally one of the most important functions of 
social fund staff. A rigorous approval system is important because it is at this stage that the 
conditions for success or failure of a project are set: for instance approval process should 
scrutinizing important questions such as whether a project truly addresses local needs and 
priorities, whether it has excessive environmental costs, or whether design and maintenance 
plans are adequate. The drawback of a rigorous approval system is that communities and 
local governments may feel that they are put at the mercy of social fund staff, particularly 
when decision making criteria are not transparent or when the reasons for project approvals 
– and more importantly rejections – are not made fully public, thus preventing staff and 
communities involved from learning from experience. 
In the practical world of many SFs, decentralization has again created dynamics that 
help to ease these trade-offs. For instance, the introduction of municipal development plans 
discussed above implies that SFs need to put less emphasis on confirming that the project 
addresses actual needs – this is generally done during the planning exercise. Likewise, in 
cases where SFs assign a global investment budget to local governments, the question is no 
longer whether or not a project proposal will be approved but when it will be approved – 
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allocation period.  
Finally in the case where SFs operate as competitive matching grant systems, local 
governments can be given a direct stake in the approval process. For instance, in the 
aforementioned Indonesian community development projects village authorities of the 
same area are required to agree on one common proposal. This in turn encourages local 
governments to propose projects that have positive externalities for neighbouring 
municipalities rather than isolated smaller projects of interests only to small communities. 
In the case of El Salvador, the SF provides participating municipalities with simple and 
comparable information about their performance on different approval criteria in order to 
enable local decision makers to identify where they need to improve (Serrano 2005). 
3.5 Project Implementation 
Implementation refers to the construction and initial operation (during a handover 
phase) of project infrastructure, or the execution of programs (e.g. literacy campaigns, 
vaccinations). It is especially concerned with oversight of these processes to ensure that 
technical and social standards set out in the project design are met. 
The most important implementation issues concern the types of project execution 
that are allowed, and the extent of local government and community participation that these 
imply. The first social funds relied on private contractors or NGOs to realize projects. An 
important innovation introduced more recently involves the transfer of project funds 
directly to the local level, allowing local decision makers to bid, contract and oversee 
project activities themselves. Solutions found in the field either work through community 
associations (Malawi), local governments (funds in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Bolivia), or variably through both local governments or communities (Peru, Honduras, 
Madagascar, cf. de Silva 2000, World Bank 2001, Serrano 2005).  
  20 Although the familiar trade-off of participation vs. efficiency applies here as well, it 
can be largely overcome by careful calibration of contracting arrangements to project type. 
Small, relatively simple infrastructure projects, for example, are well suited to direct 
contracting, and in sparsely populated countries may be more efficiently implemented by 
communities than by private contractors. In Bolivia, for example, contractors could only be 
convinced to bid for various types of rural infrastructure projects when they were bundled 
together into big contracts. But this implied large transport costs and significant 
coordination problems for urban firms headquartered far from beneficiary communities, as 
well as non-trivial learning periods for employees unfamiliar with local conditions. 
Community implementation, by contrast, took longer but often resulted in overall 
efficiency gains through lowered costs. A cross-country impact assessment of social funds 
found that closer community involvement and greater community responsibility generally 
reduced project costs (World Bank 2000d). Project quality can also improve as a result of 
strong accountability and an intimate knowledge of local conditions.  
In spite of these general advantages, the transfer of management responsibilities 
may enhance inequalities if less developed local governments or communities are not able 
to execute projects (e.g. Serrano 2005 reports this case for Bolivia). In these cases it may be 
more appropriate to follow a gradual approach, where different degrees of management 
responsibility and accompanying technical assistance are transferred as a function of local 
implementation capacities. For instance the social funds in Honduras and Nicaragua allow 
local governments to implement projects in several modalities, including one where town 
hall staff manage projects in almost complete autonomy, a second one where local 
governments implement projects in communal associations and under close and ongoing 
technical supervision, and a third one where projects are managed directly in delegated 
contract management by the SF (Serrano 2005).  
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project supervision by social fund staff as an occasion for technology transfer to 
communities and local governments. In such a process the former– which knows how – 
teaches the latter – which is interested, present on the ground and able to operate much 
more cheaply – how to implement and supervise project works. Benefits from such an 
arrangements can arise for both sides. The fund can use its regular supervision to train local 
decision makers to organize and run social investment projects, transferring important 
managerial skills in the process. At the same time, the increased involvement of locally 
accountable decision makers can help resolve basic issues of compliance (e.g. ensuring 
beneficiary contributions are paid), and it can help to make fund supervision become less 
intensive, and more focused on fund staff’s technical and managerial expertise (Alton 1999, 
World Bank 2000b, Parker and Serrano 2000). 
3.6 Operation and Maintenance 
Two of the most important questions facing social funds are long term project 
sustainability, and the extent to which the gestation of these projects strengthens or 
weakens existing public and civic institutions. Operation and Maintenance directly reflect 
the quality of processes that a fund uses to prepare projects, and hence each offers a useful 
lens through which to review and summarize some of the preceding arguments.  
Broadly defined, operation and maintenance refers to the operation of a project or 
program once social fund involvement with it has ended. Strictly speaking this is beyond 
the social fund’s remit in a decentralized framework, because municipalities and 
communities will tend to be the ultimate owners of projects. Nevertheless how a SF 
prepares projects strongly affects the chances for long-term sustainability. There are four 
main solutions to address the problem.  
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design, approval and implementation, and to ensure that communities and local 
governments participate at each stage of the project cycle. Where this is done, a project is 
more likely to benefit from local enthusiasm in ways that make long term operation and 
maintenance much more likely. Evidence from Peru shows that increased participation in 
the identification of social fund projects was associated with improved sustainability and an 
increased probability of project success (World Bank 2000d). 
The question of what constitutes sufficient evidence of support for a project is an 
important one. Early social funds, such as Bolivia’s ESF, often relied on simple declaratory 
evidence of local support, such as community resolutions, letters from mayors and other 
local leaders, or verbal expressions of enthusiasm. But such evidence is close to costless, 
and will often be proffered on behalf of projects that are valued marginally by a community 
with few outside options. By contrast, municipal and community contributions in cash and 
kind, especially when made up-front in the project identification and design phases, 
represent a much higher hurdle. They require communities in particular to raise funds and 
solve the collective action problem, and thus constitute an acid test of their commitment. 
On the other hand such requirements may penalize the poorest communities, and call for a 
greater degree of trust on the part of local beneficiaries in both the SF and local 
governments. Accordingly, community contributions carry a larger danger of disillusion 
and credibility loss if a project to which communities have contributed fails to reach 
fruition. 
The second solution is to enhance project maintenance through direct technical 
assistance. Unfortunately, social funds’ performance in this area tends to be less than 
satisfactory. Most social funds focus their capacity building efforts on rather narrowly 
defined areas of project management but leave aside training on more general local 
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functions that are crucial if local authorities are expected to operate and maintain projects 
over time. Funds in Nicaragua and Madagascar have tried to address this problem by 
setting up maintenance funds (authors’ own observations). However, and in particular 
where local revenue collection is limited, this only provides a transitory solution. Hence, 
broader capacity building efforts and local revenue reforms are often needed. Whether these 
additional activities are best addressed by social funds or other specialized local 
development agencies needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis. But social funds can 
certainly play a stronger in this domain (e.g. by providing training funds or technical 
support).  
Third, project sustainability can be enhanced through guarantees from responsible 
line agencies that newly constructed or rehabilitated infrastructures will be properly staffed 
and equipped once project works are completed. However, in practice the effectiveness of 
these agreements is often hampered by financing and planning problems within responsible 
line agencies. Hence in many cases a more promising approach seems to be to organize the 
operation of sub projects with the help of community based groups such as parent teacher 
associations, water user groups etc. For SFs this means that closer collaboration needs to be 
sought with reform initiatives and projects that try to delegate management responsibilities 
to community groups from within existing line agencies.  
Finally, social funds should actively investigate whether or not their projects are 
successful over time. How is such success measured? Doing so with high precision is a 
thorny issue, and should not be attempted in this context. Instead, funds should institute a 
simple and quick program in which all projects are visited at regular intervals after 
completion, say three and five years, and assessed according to simple criteria as to whether 
they are still operational and delivering a reasonable flow of benefits. Likewise, the quality 
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an approval criterion when new projects are assessed. Aggregate results from this process 
could then feed into the continuous improvement of SF procedures, as well as the 
evaluation of staff performance. 
4.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The evidence we discuss in this paper suggests that the social fund model is broadly 
compatible with, and even beneficial to, decentralization. The existence of SFs like those 
presented here, that work closely and well with decentralized institutions, represents a 
powerful counterargument to claims that social funds inevitably undermine local 
institutions. Indeed, many social funds have actively spearheaded decentralization through 
innovations in the project cycle and the weight of the portfolios they manage. Likewise 
once decentralization is under way, SFs have demonstrated their ability to adapt to new 
demands from the local level and/or function as a platform though which more coordinated 
decentralization programs can be implemented.  
It is nonetheless important to remember that SFs remain large-scale organizations 
that necessarily face trade-offs between the depth of support they provide to local 
governments and the number of projects they must bring to fruition in a given time and 
area. In closing, we want to suggest some general reforms that would help to tackle this 
trade-off throughout the project cycle.  
At the staff level, the best way to address trade-offs between depth and efficiency is 
through the incentives SF employees face, and not through general organizational 
directives. For instance, staff managing a super-abundance of project proposals at the 
earliest stage of the project cycle, where few resources have been invested in any given one, 
will be more likely to abandon an unpromising proposal than those seeking to nurse a few 
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should be based in part on the ultimate success of projects in the medium and long term, 
and not entirely on the number of projects managed. 
A related solution is to change the evaluation culture of social funds. Project quality 
and longer term outcomes should be evaluated at regular intervals, and results from these 
evaluations should feed into recurring reassessments and adjustments of a fund’s 
implementation procedures.  
Finally, evaluations incentives should not only exist for SF staff – they should also 
be binding on communities and local governments. To do this, SFs should create rough-
and-ready performance and sustainability indices by which local governments and 
communities are ranked in terms of the results they achieve. The nationwide dissemination 
of such an indicator would allow communities to compare their performance on fairly 
transparent, standardized terms, and contribute to the transparency and quality of local 
governance more generally. 
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